

Application No.: A.25-06-XXX
Exhibit No.: SDGE-1
Witness: Rolyn Abugan

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

ROLYN ABUGAN

ON BEHALF OF

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC VERSION

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**



JUNE 2, 2025

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ATTACHMENT A: 2024 Summary Load Data and LMP Price Forecasts.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT B: 2024 Incremental Bid Cost Calculations.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT C: 2024 Self Schedules Supporting Data 1.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT D: 2024 Self Schedules Supporting Data 2.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT E: 2024 Master File (RDT) Change Exceptions.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT F: 2024 Annual Summary.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT G: 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx

ATTACHMENT H: 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric.xlsx

ATTACHMENT I: 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 5.xlsx

ATTACHMENT J: 2024 ERRa Demand Response Metric 6.xlsx

ATTACHMENT K: Energy Storage Operational Overview - Confidential

ATTACHMENT L: Confidentiality Declaration of Rolyn Abugan

Due to the large size of the .xlsx attachments, those excel documents are only being sent electronically.

ACRONYM GLOSSARY

**PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
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I. INTRODUCTION

This testimony presents San Diego Gas & Electric Company’s (“SDG&E”) compliance with least-cost dispatch (“LCD”) requirements during the record period of January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024, as specified by applicable California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) decisions. LCD pertains to the day-ahead and intra-day dispatch and trading of SDG&E’s portfolio of resources, including utility-owned generation (“UOG”) and power purchase agreements (“PPA”). The following summarizes Commission decisions on LCD and how SDG&E implemented these decisions in a manner consistent with its current Commission-approved Bundled Procurement Plan (“BPP”).¹

Standard of Conduct 4 (“SOC 4”) was adopted by the Commission in Decision (“D.”) 02-10-062 and further discussed in D.02-12-069, D.02-12-074, D.03-06-076, and D.05-01-054. The decisions established standards of conduct by which an IOU must administer its portfolio, specifically SOC 4, which states that “[t]he utilities shall prudently administer all contracts and generation resources and dispatch the energy in a least-cost manner.”²

During 2024, SDG&E filed four quarterly Advice Letters (“AL”) covering the record period as required in D.02-10-062. AL 4435-E for Q1 2024 was effective May 30, 2024; AL 4486-E-A for Q2 2024, AL 4542-E for Q3 2024, and AL 4601-E for Q4 2024 are pending approval. These advice letters provide detailed information on transactions that SDG&E executed while following its LCD process, as well as other data (*e.g.*, customer load, resource schedules and fuel transactions) pertinent to the LCD process during the record period. SDG&E’s Quarterly Compliance Reports (“QCRs”) for 2024 were in compliance with SDG&E’s Commission-approved BPP and applicable procurement-related rulings and decisions.

¹ For purposes of the Commission’s review and the compliance findings requested herein, the relevant BPP is SDG&E’s BPP implemented by AL 2850-E (including subsequent updates thereto such as AL 3738-E approved by Resolution No. E-5196).

² D.02-10-062 at 52 and Conclusions of Law (“COL”) 11 at 74.

II. SDG&E'S COMPLIANCE SHOWING

SDG&E testimony and attachments will demonstrate compliance with LCD based on applicable regulatory requirements, notably D.15-05-005 (the "Decision") and D.18-10-006 ("Decision Approving Settlement Between San Diego Gas & Electric Company and the Office of Ratepayer Advocates").³

A. SDG&E Showing is in Accordance with D.15-05-005

Based on the Decision, SDG&E's testimony will include the following:

- Overview/narrative of LCD in the California Independent System Operator ("CAISO") markets.
- Description of SDG&E's bidding and scheduling processes.
- Summary of reports/tables documenting aggregated annual exceptions for:
 - Incremental cost bid calculations
 - Self-commitment decisions
 - Master File data changes
- Narratives reviewing significant strategy changes, internal software and/or process changes and CAISO market design changes during the record period.
- A background summary table outlining baseline annual data, including:
 - Total capacity of the dispatchable (bid in) portfolio
 - Total dispatchable capacity lost due to planned or forced outages
 - Total capacity of non-dispatchable (exclusively self-scheduled) portfolio
 - Total non-dispatchable capacity lost due to planned or forced outages
 - Total Energy awards (dispatchable and non-dispatchable by resource type and broken down by self-scheduled versus market awards)

³ The Office of Ratepayer Advocates has been renamed as the California Public Advocates Office (hereinafter referred to as "Cal PA").

- Demand Response (“DR”) metrics will be provided for dispatchable DR programs with economic triggers including the following:
 - Capacity Bidding
- Annual Summary of results reporting requirement related to dispatch of DR resources including when all programs were dispatched and an explanation of when DR resources could have been dispatched but were not.
- Calculation of the number of hours when the utility forecasts that trigger criteria will be reached, as a percentage of hours in which the trigger conditions were reached in the same period.
- Total energy actually dispatched as a proportion of maximum available energy for each DR program broken down monthly and annually.
- Explanation as to why a DR resource was not dispatched despite its maximum availability.
- Cost impact on overall resource dispatch of not calling DR programs up to their maximum available amounts when program was forecasted to be triggered.
- Consideration of whether the selection of the DR events called minimized overall portfolio cost of dispatching supply resources.
- Explanation of SDG&E’s opportunity cost methodology and demonstration of its application during the Record Year.

B. SDG&E’s LCD Showing is in Accordance With the SDG&E/Cal PA Settlement⁴

As in last year’s testimony and in accordance with the Settlement mentioned above, this testimony will include the following:

- Settlement Provision 1.2: Reasons in Attachment E- Master File Change exceptions for selecting proxy or registered costs. *See* Section V. of testimony, below, and Attachment E.
- Settlement Provision 1.3: Calculations for determining whether a discretionary self-schedule has a cost impact. *See* Section V. below and Attachments C and D.

⁴ *See* D.18-10-006.

- Settlement Provision 1.5: Report instances in which the locational marginal price (“LMP”) is greater than the bid price, but no dispatch was awarded. See Section V. below and Attachment B.
- Settlement Provision 1.6: Identify in testimony, on a month-to-month basis, which dates the Demand Response Programs were unavailable, and therefore not dispatched, due to a lack of nominations from the aggregators. See Section XI. below and Attachment G-J.

III. SDG&E PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

For the record period, most of SDG&E’s energy requirements were met with SDG&E PPAs and UOGs. SDG&E’s PPAs included qualifying facility (“QF”) contracts and contracts for renewable energy, dispatchable generation and out-of-state resources, all of which are described in the Direct Testimony of SDG&E witness Matt Richardson. SDG&E’s UOG assessment included combined-cycle (“CC”) plants, combustion turbines (“CT”) generators, and non-generating resources (“NGRs”) such as energy storage batteries.

The tables below provide summary data for resources in SDG&E’s portfolio as of January 1, 2024. The must-take resources in Table 1a are non-dispatchable; SDG&E has an obligation to accept the generation that is produced from these resources without regard to variable cost and therefore are exempt from SDG&E’s LCD process described in this testimony. The total of their generation in part determines SDG&E’s net long or short position, which did factor into LCD. The resources in Table 1b are dispatchable and were therefore the focus of SDG&E’s least-cost process during the record period. The “Capacity” column in Tables 1a and 1b below are derived from CAISO Master File Resource Data Template (“RDT”) maximum capacities for resources where SDG&E is the scheduling coordinator (“SC”) and contract capacities for resources where SDG&E is not the SC.

Table 1a: Must-Take, Wind, Solar Resources

Resource	Contract MW	Dispatch Profile	Ancillary Service Capability
QF contracts (Natural Gas)	29.10	Baseload As-Available	None
QF Renewable	.95	Intermittent As-Available	None

Renewable non-intermittent resources	33.75	Baseload (as available)	None
Renewable Intermittent Resources	2185.31 (maximum)	Intermittent	None

Table 1b: Dispatchable Resources

Resource*	Capacity MW	Dispatch Profile	Ancillary Service Capability
Palomar CCGT Natural Gas SP15	588.21	Load Following	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Cuyamaca CT Natural Gas SP15	45.42	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Miramar 1 CT Natural Gas SP15	45	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Miramar 2 CT Natural Gas SP15	44	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
YCA CT ⁵ Natural Gas NGila	55	Peaker	None
Orange Grove CT Natural Gas SP15	96	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
El Cajon Energy Center CT Natural Gas SP15	48.1	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Escondido Energy Center CT (Wellhead) Natural Gas SP15	48.71	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Desert Star CCGT Natural Gas SP15	494.58	Load Following	Spinning Reserve

⁵ The contract between SDG&E and Yuma Cogen was terminated as of May 27, 2024.

Resource*	Capacity MW	Dispatch Profile	Ancillary Service Capability
Goal Line CT Natural Gas SP15	49.9	Peaker	None
Eastern Battery NGR SP15	7.5	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 1 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 2 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 3 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Pio Pico 1 Natural Gas SP15	111.3	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Pio Pico 2 Natural Gas SP15	112.7	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Pio Pico 3 Natural Gas SP15	112	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Carlsbad 2 Natural Gas SP15	105.5	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Carlsbad MSG Natural Gas SP15	422	MSG/Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Miguel Battery NGR SP15	2	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Top Gun Battery NGR SP15	30	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserves Regulation
Valley Center Battery NGR SP15	54	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Kearny North Battery NGR	10	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation

Resource*	Capacity MW	Dispatch Profile	Ancillary Service Capability
SP15			
Kearny South Battery NGR SP15	10	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Santa Ana Battery NGR SP15	20	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Sagebrush	80	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Los Alamitos 1	10	Hybrid	None
Los Alamitos 2	10	Hybrid	None
Fallbrook	40	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Westside Canal	130	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Air Attack Base	.47	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Boulevard Energy ⁶ Storage	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Clairemont Energy ⁷ Storage	9	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Elliott Energy Storage ⁸	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None

⁶ Commercial Operations as of March 22, 2024

⁷ Commercial Operations as of March 27, 2024

⁸ Commercial Operations as of April 10, 2024

Resource*	Capacity MW	Dispatch Profile	Ancillary Service Capability
Melrose BESS 1 ⁹	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Melrose BESS 2 ¹⁰	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Pala Gomez Creek ¹¹ BESS	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Paradise Energy ¹² Storage	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
CALD BESS 1 ¹³	100	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Sanborn Solar 2 ¹⁴ SBESS 4	47	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Bottleneck Energy ¹⁵ Storage	80	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation

*CCGT= Combined Cycle Gas Turbine; CT= Combustion

IV. OVERVIEW OF LEAST-COST DISPATCH IN CAISO MARKETS

On April 1, 2009, following Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) approval of its market redesign application, the CAISO implemented the Market Redesign Technology Upgrade (“MRTU”) now simply referred to as the “Market”, which introduced fundamental changes in the way resources are committed and dispatched. The most significant of these

⁹ Commercial Operations as of March 15, 2024

¹⁰ Commercial Operations as of March 15, 2024

¹¹ Commercial Operations as of March 14, 2024

¹² Commercial Operations as of March 15, 2024

¹³ Commercial Operations as of August 28, 2024

¹⁴ Commercial Operations as of October 16, 2024

¹⁵ Commercial Operations as of October 26, 2024

1 changes was the implementation of a centralized energy market which requires load-serving
2 entities (“LSEs”) to procure energy and ancillary services (“A/S”), and generators to sell energy
3 and A/S, through the CAISO markets based on self-schedules and economic bids.

4 The CAISO established a centralized spot market that enables all resources, through
5 standardized bidding and scheduling rules, to be competitively dispatched based on costs to serve
6 total system load, subject to operational and transmission constraints. These resources are not
7 matched up to any LSE’s load; LSEs now meet their needs by self-scheduling or bidding for
8 energy in the CAISO market. However, LSEs may rely on bilaterally procured resources to
9 hedge the day-to-day cost of buying energy and A/S from the CAISO markets, to the extent these
10 contracted resources pass on the revenues for energy and A/S awards received from those same
11 CAISO markets back to the LSE.

12 SDG&E periodically revises and improves its LCD processes to meet tariff rules and
13 operating requirements while maintaining compliance with SOC 4, particularly with regard to
14 self-schedules, convergence bids and economic bids for its dispatchable resources. These self-
15 schedules and bids for dispatchable units must accurately reflect variable costs to enable the
16 CAISO market to produce energy and A/S awards for SDG&E’s resources that are consistent
17 with LCD. SDG&E utilizes a cross-validation procedure for bids to ensure the accuracy of its
18 resource bids with respect to cost and the accuracy of its self-schedules in the CAISO market.

19 The CAISO market solves for the least-cost unit commitment and dispatch solution
20 incorporating self-schedules and economic bids from generators and load which takes into
21 account resource operational characteristics and constraints, resource and transmission outages,
22 impact of convergence bids, inter-temporal constraints and the effect of adjacent balancing
23 authorities impacted by the CAISO system. It is important to note that CAISO is solving for the
24 lowest system cost over a 24-hour time horizon, not the highest revenue for a resource; therefore,
25 looking at a resource’s awards in isolation may not yield expected results on an hourly basis. If a
26 resource is awarded in a manner below their costs for a given 24-hour period, the resource may
27 qualify for bid cost recovery (“BCR”). The nodal (“Pnode”) market prices explicitly account for
28 the economic effects of re-dispatching resources to relieve congestion constraints.

29 The CAISO optimizes the dispatch of the several hundred generators across its system to
30 find the overall lowest-cost mix of resources to meet CAISO system load requirements
31 (including those of SDG&E). The CAISO market also co-optimizes the allocation of

1 dispatchable capacity between generation and A/S capacity, based on prices submitted for each
2 of these services in the resource bids.¹⁶ The resulting allocation of awards between generation
3 and A/S across the system therefore reflects the economic tradeoff between capacity used for
4 generation and what is reserved for A/S.

5 The CAISO employs an iterative mixed-integer programming methodology to account
6 for the numerous constraints cited above. A technical bulletin published by the CAISO describes
7 in greater detail its LCD optimization processes with respect to the IFM (“Integrated Forward
8 Market”). Specifically, Section 2.3 states:

9 The SCUC [Security Constrained Unit Commitment] engine determines optimally
10 the commitment status and the Schedules of Generating Units as well as
11 Participating Loads and Resource-Specific System Resources.

12 ***The objective is to minimize the Start-Up and Minimum Load costs and bid in***
13 ***Energy costs and Ancillary Services, subject to network as well as resource***
14 ***related constraints over the entire Time Horizon***, e.g., the Trading Day in the
15 IFM. The time interval of the optimization is one hour in the DAM and 5 or 15
16 minutes in the RTM depending on the application.

17 In IFM the overall production (or Bid) cost is determined by the total of the Start-
18 Up and Minimum Load Cost of CAISO-committed Generating Units, the Energy
19 Bids of all scheduled Generating Units, and the Ancillary Service Bids of
20 resources selected to provide Ancillary Services. ***This objective leads to a least-***
21 ***cost multi-product co-optimization methodology that maximizes economic***
22 ***efficiency, relieves network Congestion and considers physical constraints.*** The
23 economic efficiency of the market operation can be achieved through a least cost
24 resource commitment and scheduling with co-optimization of Energy and
25 Ancillary Services.¹⁷

26 A feature of the CAISO market is the ability for market participants to submit
27 self-schedules rather than economic (or price) bids for load and generation. A self-schedule is a
28 price-taker bid that is awarded, regardless of the Pnode clearing price (even if negative), subject
29 to operational constraints. SDG&E submits a self-schedule for its forecasted load in the Day
30 Ahead Market (“DAM”). SDG&E also submits self-schedules for its (non-intermittent

¹⁶ For example, if a generator’s energy bid price is \$10/MWh in-the-money relative to the clearing price, then the IFM may award the generator an A/S award only if the A/S clearing price exceeds \$10 or the generator’s bid, whichever is greater.

¹⁷ California ISO, *Technical Bulletin 2009-06-05: Market Optimization Details* (November 19, 2009) at 2-8 – 2-9 (emphasis added), available at <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/TechnicalBulletin-MarketOptimizationDetails.pdf>.

resources) must take resources in the DAM.¹⁸ This approach is needed because SDG&E has an obligation to receive energy from these resources, regardless of the market price, and self-scheduling in the DAM ensures that revenues paid to these resources effectively offset costs charged to SDG&E load.

Generally, self-schedules do not support the least-cost objective if a resource is capable of responding to price signals. As described earlier, self-schedules are price-taker bids which may provide no assurance that market revenues will pay for fuel and other operating costs, and thereby may expose SDG&E ratepayers to unnecessary risk of losses. Furthermore, self-schedules could affect the CAISO's ability to optimally procure energy and A/S which are necessary for grid reliability. Operational constraints will at times make self-scheduling preferable to cost based bids.

Consequently, SDG&E primarily submits cost-based price bids for its dispatchable generation rather than self-schedules. Under CAISO market rules, cost-based bids provide SDG&E ratepayers a means to recover variable costs associated with start-up, minimum load, and dispatch from the market. Moreover, price bids enable the CAISO to perform its co-optimization between energy and A/S awards.

Finally, with respect to LCD, price bids allow for CAISO market results to meet the least-cost dispatch solution across the entire system, including SDG&E's service territory, because the CAISO selects the mix of resources with the lowest total variable cost (as represented by their price bids) to meet load requirements. To the extent SDG&E submits cost-based price bids reflecting variable costs per D.02-09-053, and most accurately represents operational parameters and constraints to the CAISO, the results produced by the CAISO markets for SDG&E's supply portfolio are consistent with the Commission's LCD requirements.

V. LEAST-COST DISPATCH SCHEDULING AND BIDDING PROCESS

SDG&E's LCD process is managed by SDG&E's Energy Supply and Dispatch Group ("ES&D"). Key personnel involved in daily LCD activity in the 2024 record period included fuel traders and schedulers, power traders, day-ahead (pre)schedulers and real-time transaction schedulers and analysts. The LCD process consisted of numerous functions, which are described in this section.

¹⁸ For brevity, this prepared direct testimony does not distinguish between SDG&E or the resource owner performing the Scheduling Coordinator functions for SDG&E's resources.

A. Pre-Day-Ahead Planning

During the record period, LCD forecasts for a particular delivery date began with a weekly production cost model that optimized resources to serve SDG&E's load requirement for the following 12-day period. The model software ("GenTrader")¹⁹ was set up with numerous parameters, including load forecast, plant operating data, resource availabilities/outages, forecasted Locational Marginal Pricing ("LMP") prices for all relevant pricing points and dispatch constraints which allowed the model to perform complex analysis to produce a preliminary forecast of generation dispatch and market transactions that minimized total cost to serve the forecasted load requirement. The GenTrader model produced expected utilization of resources for the planning horizon, including dispatch levels, fuel requirements and market transactions. A detailed description of the inputs to GenTrader which SDG&E used for determining an LCD forecast is as follows:

1. Load forecasts: SDG&E produced load forecasts using a load forecasting model developed by Enverus²⁰. The model utilizes multiple AI technologies such as artificial neural networks, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, and evolutionary computing,²¹ and special proprietary algorithms analyzing relationships between historical bundled load and weather data to develop the load forecast for SDG&E's customers. Prior to July 2023, SDG&E was calculating their bundled load by taking a System Load forecast (produced by Enverus) subtracting System losses and subtracting the Community Choice Aggregation (CCA)/Direct Access customer forecast. In order to eliminate the multiple variables in calculating

¹⁹ SDG&E uses GenTrader, a production cost and optimization software application produced by Power Costs Inc. ("PCI"). GenTrader employs an optimization algorithm to calculate the optimal, constraints-bound mix of market transactions and generation from SDG&E's resource portfolio over the study period. SDG&E acquired GenTrader as part of a PCI product suite in preparation for the new Market. PCI introduced GenTrader in 1999 and continues to implement modeling and technology enhancements that SDG&E receives under its license agreement. GenTrader is used by other clients across the country in nodal and traditional markets to optimize generation portfolios. Additional product description is available at PCI, Speeding Decisions, Optimization & Analytics, available at <https://www.pcienergysolutions.com/solutions/energy-trading-and-optimization/portfolio-optimization/>.

²⁰ Previously known as Pattern Recognition Technologies. Inc. ("PRT")

²¹ As defined by Drilling Info, Future Technology Today, Ensemble of Adaptive Intelligent System Models, available at <https://www.enverus.com/products/short-term-grid-analytics-and-forecasting-solutions/>.

1 bundled load, SDG&E began using historical actual (metered) bundled load from
2 customer meters. The historical bundled load actuals allow for better control of
3 inputs by eliminating unnecessary inputs to the prior bundled load forecast.
4 These load forecasts were produced daily as inputs to the GenTrader 12-day LCD
5 forecast.

- 6 2. Master File Updates and Operating constraints: The GenTrader model also
7 required a variety of cost inputs for each dispatchable resource to properly
8 determine its dispatch cost. The Master Files included a subset of data accessible
9 by the resource's scheduling coordinator which is referred to as the Resource Data
10 Template ("RDT"). SDG&E periodically submitted master file changes via an
11 RDT update process that was validated by CAISO. Such data included but was
12 not limited to heat rates, ramp rates and variable operation and maintenance costs
13 ("VOM"), minimum and maximum operating points, fuel delivery charges and
14 start-up and minimum load costs. In addition, numerous operating
15 constraints/parameters, included in the RDT, were also fed into the model
16 including start-up time, minimum shutdown and run times, multi-stage generation
17 ("MSG") transitions and ramp rates. The GenTrader model optimized the
18 dispatch of each resource given its generation cost and operating constraints.
- 19 3. Forecast of resource availability: A portion of SDG&E's resource portfolio was
20 comprised of must-take resources (QF and renewable energy), as listed in Section
21 II. SDG&E received weekly, and in some cases daily, forecasts of hourly
22 deliveries from the resource operator. In addition, SDG&E generated availability
23 forecasts for some smaller contracts based on historical performance. If the unit
24 availabilities varied from the full operating capability or were on outage, they
25 were communicated to the CAISO via the Outage Management System
26 application ("OMS").
- 27 4. Market prices: The GenTrader LCD forecast model required a forecast of fuel
28 prices for each of the dispatchable resources in SDG&E's portfolio, and a forecast
29 of hourly power prices for various market delivery points where SDG&E
30 generation units were located. Fuel prices were based on forward natural gas
31 price curves at SoCal Border, SoCal CityGate and Kern Delivered locations

1 derived from the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”), Intercontinental
2 Exchange (“ICE”) and broker quotes, and also including tariff or contract gas
3 transportation costs. Power prices were based on forward power price curves for
4 block power (derived from ICE and broker quotes) and shaped for each hour
5 using price weighting factors derived from historical prices and load profiles.

- 6 5. Miscellaneous: Use-limited resources including NGR resources and demand
7 response products were not modeled by GenTrader due to unique operating
8 constraints and were therefore optimized separately on a day-ahead/weekly basis
9 based on market conditions, LMP price forecasts and operating parameters.

10 GenTrader was then used to calculate the hourly dispatch level of dispatchable resource
11 over the modeled period that was economic, or “in-the-money,” relative to forecasted LMP
12 prices. This determination considered up-front commitment costs (start-up and minimum load
13 costs), incremental dispatch costs which varied by output level, and various operational
14 constraints mostly consistent with resource data template (“RDT”) data used by the CAISO in its
15 market processes. For must-take resources, generation was assumed to equal their forecasted
16 availabilities. If the sum of must-take and in-the-money dispatchable generation was less than
17 that hour’s load requirement, the short position, or Residual Net Short (“RNS”), was considered
18 to be met with market purchases. If the sum of must-take and in-the-money generation was
19 greater than that hour’s load requirement, the long position was considered to be surplus
20 generation available for economic market sales.

21 **B. Day-Ahead Planning**

22 On a day-ahead basis by approximately 6:00 a.m., pre-schedulers updated the PCI
23 software with updated values, specifically the load forecast, forecasted market prices and
24 resource availabilities. Other resource operational data such as heat rates are relatively static
25 between the 12-day plan and day-ahead plan and were not typically updated. Key distinctions
26 between the 12-day and day-ahead model parameters were as follows:

- 27 1. Load forecast: SDG&E used a revised Enverus forecast with updated temperature
28 and humidity forecasts. In addition, pre-schedulers have the ability to manually
29 adjust the Enverus forecast to offset known limitations to the model. For
30 example, because Enverus forecasts are based on historical data, SDG&E may

1 make adjustments to reflect sudden changes to the weather forecast such as the
2 onset of a heat wave. SDG&E did not make any manual adjustments in 2024.

- 3 2. Resource availabilities: SDG&E received updated and more accurate availability
4 information for its resources on a day-ahead basis. These updates captured
5 information that may not have been included in the 12-day model, such as
6 ambient derates, forced derates, unit testing and outages. These updates were also
7 submitted to the CAISO via OMS as required.

- 8 3. Market prices: Spot natural gas and power trade actively in the day-ahead market.
9 SDG&E used two different price forecasts as inputs into optimization models.
10 One price forecast is developed internally, in the early morning before and during
11 Day-Ahead (“DA”) trading, and the second was provided by an external entity
12 after most of the DA trading subsided. For the first price forecast, SDG&E used
13 an internal forecasting tool to forecast load and resource prices for the DA Market
14 to be used for initial optimization model studies which helps provide guidance for
15 CAISO generation awards, gas burn obligations, and market transactions. This
16 internal DA price forecast utilizes actual market prices that are selected based on
17 days that represent similar weather conditions, heat rates, gas prices, and other
18 system conditions. The South Path 15 (SP15) trading hub due to its location in
19 Southern California is used as the proxy location that trades on the
20 Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and serves as a benchmark for how SDG&E’s
21 resources might clear. SDG&E applies a shaping factor based on the comparison
22 of forecasted nodes’ clearing prices to the clearing price of SP-15 which results in
23 hourly forecasted prices for all of SDG&E’s resource nodes and its Default Load
24 Aggregation Point (DLAP). The second forecast was normally received after
25 8:00AM which is typically after most of the DA trading volume is completed and
26 serves as the final forecast that is used for resource management and bidding
27 purposes. Because of the later receipt time, SDG&E’s internally developed price
28 forecast is used for preliminary optimization runs, to provide an initial forecast for
29 CAISO generation awards. In 2018, SDG&E began receiving nodal DA LMP

price forecasts from an outside entity called Wood Mackenzie.²² Wood Mackenzie is an independent, energy industry provider of “market intelligence” which includes nodal DA LMP forecasts and possible transmission congestion risks associated with SDG&E’s generation portfolio of resources. Wood Mackenzie produces price forecasts daily. Weekend and holiday forecasts are provided the last day before that weekend or holiday period. SDG&E has provided a record of price forecast accuracy with respect to forecasted LMP (SP15 Trading Hub and SDG&E’s DLAP) for 2024 and a comparison of forecast accuracy from the previous year in Attachment A - *2024 Summary Load Data and LMP price forecasts.xls*).²³ Both editions of forecasted LMPs are entered into PCI to reflect updated market conditions to run the optimization model.

After updating the GenTrader model with these inputs, SDG&E then re-optimized the mix of market transactions and resource dispatches. As with the 12-day plan, GenTrader produced a plan for unit commitments, dispatch levels and economic purchases and sales. These results helped inform gas and power trading requirements and analyze the potential for self-scheduling of dispatchable resources.

C. Day-Ahead Trading and Scheduling

The CAISO runs the DAM to economically clear load and resources that were scheduled or bid in. The DAM required SDG&E to submit separate schedules and bids for each resource and load. Results of the DAM became financially binding at the market clearing price for each resource and load that was awarded, and the sum of SDG&E’s awarded resources did not necessarily balance with SDG&E’s load award. The process to self-schedule and bid in SDG&E’s load and resources is discussed below.

- Load: During the record period, SDG&E began bidding a small portion of its bundled load forecast. SDG&E still sought to self-schedule the majority of the day-ahead bundled load forecast. Self-scheduling ensured that SDG&E would purchase its forecasted load requirement in the DAM rather than rolling the

²² Formerly known as Genscape, Inc.

²³ SDG&E has provided the best data available at the time of submittal on June 2, 2025. SDG&E will provide an updated Attachment A if there are any changes after the original submittal.

1 requirement into the real-time market which may produce more volatile prices.
2 The DAM was preferred for two other reasons. The first reason was that SDG&E
3 was required to self-schedule or bid in its (non-use limited) resources into the
4 DAM under Resource Adequacy must-offer rules in the CAISO Tariff.
5 Therefore, while balanced schedules were not mandated, the DAM did provide a
6 means for supply revenues to effectively offset the load costs provided that
7 SDG&E self-scheduled its load in the DAM. The second reason was that the
8 depth of the day-ahead bilateral market allowed SDG&E to hedge its self-
9 scheduled load exposed to the CAISO DAM clearing price via market
10 transactions.

11 The portion of forecasted load in which SDG&E elected to bid into the market
12 rather than self-schedule was bid at prices based on the Real Time pricing
13 forecasts provided by Wood Mackenzie. Attachment A - *2024 Summary Load*
14 *Data and LMP Price Forecasts.xlsx* contains detailed summary load data and
15 results.

- 16 • Non-intermittent must-take resources: SDG&E continued to self-schedule
17 available must-take generation on a day-ahead basis to offset DAM load awards.
18 For resources that were scheduled by sellers and not SDG&E, sellers continued to
19 self-schedule their available generation into the DAM. Credit for the DA
20 revenues was transferred back to SDG&E either via an Inter-SC Trade (“IST”) for
21 the self-scheduled quantity or settled after the fact by the settlements group.
- 22 • Generation convergence bids: One of SDG&E’s intermittent resources that is a
23 Variable Energy Resource (“VER”) was scheduled in the hour-ahead scheduling
24 process as required by the CAISO. SDG&E utilized convergence bids to
25 effectively shift the CAISO’s payment for this VER resource from the real-time
26 market to the DAM, thereby providing a better offset to load charges which, as
27 discussed above, settle against DAM prices. The Commission authorized
28 Convergence Bidding in D.10-12-034.²⁴ The daily process consists of three main
29 steps: (1) retrieval of the day-ahead VER forecast for the relevant resource; (2)

²⁴ D.10-12-034 allows the IOUs to recover the costs associated with Convergence Bidding in ERRR.

1 creation of convergence bid quantities considering (a) the percentage of the day-
2 ahead VER MW volume forecast to be shifted into the DAM, (b) convergence bid
3 quantity limitations imposed by the CAISO and (c) reduction of quantities in
4 hours that have expected forecasted negative returns and/or historically produced
5 negative returns on the convergence bids SDG&E would have submitted; and (3)
6 pricing of convergence bids such that the virtual supply was not sold at
7 unreasonably low price levels. SDG&E's Convergence Bidding activity for the
8 Record Year was reported and was already approved for the first two quarters of
9 2024 (third quarter is pending approval and fourth quarter is being audited) in the
10 Quarterly Compliance Reports ("QCRs") that SDG&E submits to the
11 Procurement Review Group as required by D.10-12-034.²⁵ The remaining VER
12 resources in the portfolio utilized energy bids to also attempt to shift the CAISO's
13 payment for VER resources from the real-time market to the DAM.

- 14 • Dispatchable resources: SDG&E's objective, with respect to self-schedules and
15 price bids for dispatchable resources, was to maintain adherence to LCD
16 principles. This objective was primarily met by bidding generation into the DAM
17 at cost-based prices consistent with the LCD modeling.
- 18 • Generator price bids: Energy bids consist of three basic components - startup
19 cost, minimum load cost and incremental energy bids. Startup and minimum load
20 costs, which can be declared as registered or proxy, were used in the CAISO
21 DAM. In addition, bidding rules required that incremental energy bids be
22 monotonically increasing over the range of output. Other components of the price
23 bid that pertained to A/S-certified units are bids for Regulation, Spinning Reserve
24 and Non-Spinning Reserve. As discussed in Section V below, the DAM
25 algorithm co-optimized dispatchable capacity between generation and A/S
26 awards; and the generator was paid an amount greater than or equal to its
27 opportunity cost of forgoing a profitable day-ahead energy sale. However, co-

²⁵ SDG&E includes a summary of its Convergence Bidding activities in this testimony as it is seeking to recover the costs associated therewith pursuant to D.10-12-034. However, SDG&E is not seeking a compliance review of its specific Convergence Bidding activities as those have already been approved in the QCRs.

1 optimization did not consider lost energy sales in the real-time market. Therefore,
2 SDG&E incorporated an estimate of expected real-time energy market net
3 revenues that the A/S capacity could otherwise derive from that market.

- 4 • Battery Storage: SDG&E performed a separate optimization analysis of Battery
5 Storage due to its unique operational characteristics and opportunity costs
6 associated with potential Ancillary Service revenues and real-time prices. For
7 example, its cost was based on the cost of power required to charge the battery
8 such that the battery can generate power at a later time. Secondly, it was only
9 economic to operate the battery (from an LCD perspective) when the cost of
10 charging the battery was recovered by revenues from discharging the battery.
11 Battery storage makes up 730MWs of the portfolio. While that is only a portion
12 of the overall portfolio, it is a technology with unique features which presented
13 significant modeling challenges. To deal with these challenges, SDG&E has
14 developed a unique process to submit bids to optimize the dispatch of this
15 resource which differ from other parts of its portfolio. The factors considered in
16 determining bids for battery Storage resources are: (1) Forecasted and historical
17 DA, RT and A/S prices, (2) charge efficiency parameters, (3) variable O&M
18 costs, (4) State of Charge, (5) charge/discharge capacity, (6) cycling limitations,
19 and (7) time parameters. Trading and scheduling personnel reviewed the bids, to
20 ensure all other operational constraints were respected, and processed the final
21 bids for charge and discharge bids in SDG&E's scheduling application for
22 submittal into the CAISO market.
- 23 • Power Trades: During the 2024 record period, SDG&E primarily traded day-
24 ahead financial power to hedge the risk of unknown DAM clearing prices, and
25 their effect on the magnitude of market awards on SDG&E's resources. Financial
26 power was traded in lieu of physical power due to greater market liquidity but
27 provided the same hedge. The volume of energy purchased or sold was informed
28 by the results of the GenTrader LCD model and a position analysis spreadsheet
29 developed in-house; both tools calculated SDG&E's hourly short or long position
30 based on similar inputs and provided a more robust result of hedging needs than a
31 single model. SDG&E traded these products on the ICE or through voice brokers

1 to ensure competitive prices and submitted these trades for Commission review in
2 its QCR.

3 **D. Hour-Ahead Scheduling and Real-Time Dispatch**

4 The CAISO operated the Real-Time Market (“RTM”) that performed several important
5 functions related to LCD while matching generation and demand to maintain the frequency of
6 the grid. Like the DAM, the RTM established financially binding awards for awarded hour-
7 ahead self-schedules and bids, but only at intertie scheduling points. In addition, the RTM
8 enabled SDG&E to submit updated self-schedules and cost-based bids for its dispatchable
9 resources, so the CAISO could issue incremental or decremental dispatches in the real-time
10 market based on this updated data. SDG&E also self-scheduled its VER resources in RTM as
11 required under VER rules. Of note, the CAISO did not allow load self-schedules and bids to be
12 updated in RTM; any differences between actual load and the load quantity cleared in the DAM
13 were automatically settled at the real-time market price.

14 The CAISO issued incremental and decremental awards an hour before delivery for
15 intertie bids and in real-time (5 to 15 minutes ahead) for online or fast-start internal generation
16 through its Automated Dispatch System (“ADS”). Decremental energy awards essentially
17 caused resources to buy back the day-ahead award if the RTM or real-time price fell below the
18 bid price submitted in RTM; incremental awards caused resources to sell additional energy or
19 A/S relative to the day-ahead award. SDG&E’s resources responded directly to these ADS
20 instructions. If a resource experienced an unplanned outage or other change in operational
21 capability, these updates were submitted to the CAISO via OMS as required to notify the CAISO
22 of the status and preclude infeasible real-time dispatch instructions.

23 Because real-time prices are historically more volatile than, and can deviate significantly
24 from, the day-ahead price, the impact of the real-time market on SDG&E’s LCD results varied
25 day-to-day. This impact could be particularly negative if real-time market prices spiked when
26 SDG&E’s portfolio was significantly short. The short position could arise for several reasons,
27 including:

- 28 • SDG&E generally self-scheduled 100% of its forecasted load in the DAM; if
29 actual load exceeded the forecast, the result was a short real-time position;
- 30 • Resources (must-take and dispatchable) that were awarded in the DAM carried a
31 delivery obligation in the real-time market for the awarded quantity; thus, an

1 outage or curtailment to any of these resources that prevented it from meeting its
2 day-ahead obligation resulted in a short real-time position;

- 3 • Awarded convergence bids in the DAM triggered a buyback in the real-time
4 market; if this buyback was not fully covered by physical generation, the
5 convergence bid resulted in a short real-time position; and
- 6 • If real-time prices were lower than day-ahead, the CAISO could dispatch
7 resources below their day-ahead award, as described earlier in this section; these
8 decremental dispatches would result in a short real-time position (albeit a
9 desirable one should real-time prices continue to remain low).

10 If real-time prices spiked under any one or more of these scenarios, SDG&E's
11 dispatchable resources may not have been able to ramp quickly enough to fully eliminate the
12 short position. The combination of real-time price spikes and short portfolio position was and
13 continues to be a constant risk to ratepayers, depending on the severity of each.

14 **E. Award Retrieval and Validation**

15 SDG&E retrieved CAISO day-ahead awards and communicated them to its resources.
16 While dispatchable generators in fact respond to CAISO ADS or regulation dispatch in real-time,
17 they required timely notice of day-ahead awards in order to adequately prepare to meet startup,
18 shutdown and MSG transition requirements. Furthermore, advance notification of regulation
19 awards ensured that generators would be prepared to operate in Automated Generation Control
20 ("AGC") in order to follow regulation dispatch. Lastly, the day-ahead notification allowed
21 enough time to address any inconsistencies between a generator's day-ahead award and its stated
22 operational constraints previously communicated to the CAISO through OMS.

23 SDG&E performed a post-market assessment to review market results and validate that
24 the CAISO process resulted in LCD of SDG&E's portfolio. The assessment is referred to as the
25 Bid Evaluator report, provided through the PCI software package. Bid Evaluator compared
26 SDG&E's expected day-ahead awards for its dispatchable generation based on published market
27 prices with actual DAM results. Generally, the market results aligned closely with Bid Evaluator
28 results (subject to operational constraints), confirming that LCD of SDG&E's portfolio was
29 achieved.

30 Although SDG&E investigated substantive deviations between CAISO market solutions
31 and Bid Evaluator optimization, any deviations did not necessarily indicate an incorrect dispatch

1 or need for further action. Upon citing a deviation, SDG&E could modify inputs or bidding
2 strategy, initiate a change proposal to PCI for development, or notify CAISO of deviations to
3 determine the cause which may be recognized as a market flaw through Customer Inquiry
4 Dispute and Information (“CIDI”) tickets.

5 **VI. CONSTRAINTS TO LEAST-COST DISPATCH**

6 As stated in the discussion of LCD principles, SDG&E performed its LCD activities
7 within limits established by numerous types of constraints that range from operational,
8 regulatory and contractual to risk mitigation and market conditions. An after-the-fact review of a
9 particular day’s dispatch may show a deviation from LCD because of the effects of such
10 constraints.

11 Some constraints were operating limits inherent to the resources in the portfolio. For
12 example, generators cannot continually cycle back and forth between online and offline because
13 of minimum run time and shutdown time of each combustion turbine. Therefore, the lowest cost
14 unit may not have been dispatched if adequate time for startup was not available. Some other
15 common examples of LCD constraints include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 16 • Exceptional Dispatch (“ED”) is a form of dispatch the CAISO relies on to meet
17 reliability requirements that cannot be resolved through market processes. The
18 CAISO orders EDs to address local generation requirements, system capacity
19 needs, transmission outages, software limitations and other operational issues.
20 Because EDs are reliability-driven, they are outside the scope of LCD and likely
21 to be uneconomic relative to market prices or other resources. All CAISO
22 resources are obligated to comply with these dispatches.
- 23 • Residual Unit Commitment (“RUC”) is a market award for capacity, which the
24 CAISO issues to ensure that sufficient capacity is committed to meet system load.
25 Although RUC resulted from the market process, it is required to manage grid
26 reliability and is outside the scope of LCD. SDG&E resources were obligated to
27 be available to provide the RUC capacity if awarded, which required that they
28 could be committed uneconomically relative to other resources.
- 29 • Unit testing and maintenance, such as Relative Accuracy Test Audit (“RATA”)
30 tests and heat treats, require generators to run at pre-defined load points to achieve

an objective. During these periods, generation is considered must-take and cannot be dispatched according to LCD economics.

- Constrained pipeline operations may impact LCD. A generator may be constrained in its ability to provide real-time dispatch because of limited gas balancing rights on a pipeline. Another example of pipeline constraints was Operational Flow Orders (“OFOs”). An OFO occurs when the anticipated deliveries in a gas system such as Southern California Gas Company (“SoCalGas”) are greater than the maximum forecasted capacity or less than the minimum forecasted capacity of the system for a given day. These two scenarios can result in either a high inventory OFO or a low inventory OFO and can impact dispatch decisions. Under a high inventory OFO, if a resource fails to consume the required designated percentage of its delivered natural gas quantity, the pipeline will assess penalties. Under a low inventory OFO, if a resource fails to deliver the designated minimum percentage of its natural gas quantity, the pipeline will assess penalties. These scenarios may constrain resources from decreasing or increasing generation in response to prices.
- Use-limited resources are resources that are only available for a limited number of hours or starts per period. For example, annual environmental restrictions limit the number of startups on certain combustion turbines. Other resources that were use-limited include Demand Response programs that can be triggered for limited hours each month.
- CAISO market solutions look at 24-hour time horizons and to come up with the most economic “system” solution, individual resources may need to be awarded uneconomically or may not be awarded even though a specific resource may appear to be economical with respect to its clearing prices to satisfy specific reliability requirements. Therefore, LCD is achieved on a system basis while satisfying unique transmission and reliability constraints as opposed to evaluating an individual unit on an hour by hour basis.

VII. SUMMARY REPORTS AND TABLES

In this Section, SDG&E provides additional detailed information that support SDG&E’s execution of the LCD process during 2024, as described in Section V. The following provides a

1 description of information provided as well as tables which summarize annual exceptions for
2 incremental cost bid calculations, self-commitment decisions and Master File data changes:

- 3 1. Incremental Cost Bid - Incremental bids submitted to the CAISO are calculated
4 using the heat rate, fuel costs, fuel transportation fees, GHG costs, and variable
5 operations and maintenance costs and any other costs used in the calculation. For
6 the record period, the annual and monthly tables below provide a listing of all
7 variances between calculated and submitted bids that are greater than \$0.10 and
8 the related cost impacts. In addition, the table provides any occurrences where
9 dispatchable resources were not bid into the CAISO markets when available.
10 Attachment B – 2024 *Incremental Bid Cost Calculations.xlsx* provides details of
11 incremental bids submitted to the CAISO and any potential exceptions. Potential
12 reasons for LMP clearing higher than incremental bid costs include but are not
13 limited to the consideration of start-up and minimum load costs, MIP (“Mixed
14 Integer Processing”) gap, inter-temporal constraints, transmission constraints,
15 conditions used as initial conditions for next day and the effect of adjacent
16 balancing authorities’ areas.

Table 2 below summarizes the potential impact of the bid exceptions.

Table 2			
Summary of 2024 Incremental Bid Cost Exceptions			
Month	No. of Variances (2B)	% of Bids Submitted	Cost Impact \$ (2C)
January			
February*			
March			
April			
May			
June			
July			
August			
September			
October			
November			
December			
Total/Avg.			
*Variances were a result of unit testing. No Cost Impact			

As reflected in Table 2 above, SDG&E did not have any exceptions in 2024.

Self-Commitment – The summary tables 3-a and 3-b below contain the costs of self-schedule decisions for dispatchable thermal resources during the record period. Also contained are details including total energy self-scheduled and supporting data of daily forecasts of schedules if bid or self-scheduled, forecast revenues and bid costs if bid or self-scheduled, and decisions to self-schedule or bid. Attachment C - *2024 Self Schedules Supporting Data 1.xlsx* and Attachment D - *2024 Self Schedules Supporting Data 2.xlsx* contain the details of self-commitment costs and the reasons to self-schedule. Table 3-a and 3-b below summarize cost

impacts of self-scheduling.

Summary of 2024 Self Schedules								
Month	1) Self	2) Market Awards	3) Self Schedule	4) Self Schedule	5) Revenue - Costs for	6) Bid Cost	7) Revenues	8) Revenue - Costs
January								
February								
March								
April								
May								
June								
July								
August								
September								
October								
November								
December								
2020 Total								

Table 3-b Summary of 2024 Hypothetical Non-Self Schedules			
Month	1) Estimated	2) Estimated	3) Estimated
January			
February			
March			
April			
May			
June			
July			
August			
September			
October			
November			
December			
2020 Total			
Note: Assumes \$0 costs for potential hot start.			

2. Master File Data Changes – SDG&E can change Master File submissions to reflect Proxy or Registered Start-Up or Minimum Load costs for its dispatchable resources depending on market conditions. In 2024, SDG&E solely submitted Proxy costs for its dispatchable resources. Table 4, the annual table below, summarizes the number of times and the reasons for selecting proxy or registered costs. In addition, the tables provide the frequency of calculations that differed from values submitted to the CAISO, and the cost impacts, by month. Attachment E – 2024 *Master File (RDT) Change Exceptions.xlsx* provides the details of changes made during the record period. Table 4 below summarizes proxy and registered cost change exceptions.

Table 4
Summary of 2024 PROXY and Registered Cost Change Exceptions

Category	Proxy Elections	Registered Elections	Incorrect Submissions	Error Rate
Startup	14	0	0	0%
Minload	14	0	0	0%
Totals	28	0	0	0%

VIII. MARKET DESIGN AND PROCESS CHANGES

The following is a summary of certain CAISO market design changes that may have affected SDG&E's business processes during 2024:

1. Price Formation Enhancements – Soft Offer Bid Cap: This initiative raised the real-time market soft offer cap for energy storage and hydro resources that use the Non-Generator Resource model from \$1,000 to \$2,000, which will allow these resources to bid above their Default Energy Bids under certain conditions. This change aligns CAISO's real-time soft offer cap with those of external resources.
 - This policy change will allow CAISO resources to better reflect intra-day opportunity costs and prevent premature dispatch during stressed grid conditions, as well as allow resources to better maintain their day-ahead market schedules when real-time prices exceed the soft-offer cap.
2. Bid Cost Recovery Rules for Storage Resources - This initiative changed the calculation for Bid Cost Recovery to ensure that storage resources are more exposed to real-time prices.
 - This change would allow for the use of a proxy value to represent a storage resource's real-time energy bid cost based on the market dispatch of that resource in the 15-minute and five-minute market in relation to the resource's market award in the day-ahead market or the 15-minute market, respectively. These proxy values apply to storage resources in all real-time market intervals. By using these values in the BCR calculation, the risk of unwarranted real-time bid cost recovery payments will be mitigated and the incentive for scheduling coordinators to engage in strategic bidding for storage resources will be reduced.

- 1 3. Interconnection Process Enhancements Phase 2 - This phase of the IPE initiative
2 built on Phase 1, which enacted near-term adjustments to the Cluster 15 study
3 schedule. Phase 2 introduced a new scoring criterion into the interconnection
4 process, emphasizing project readiness and competition for projects to advance to
5 the study stage.
- 6 • Developed a system to score projects based on indicators related to
7 commercial interest, project viability, and system need. Allowed CAISO
8 to consider preliminary and non-binding interest allocations from LSEs
9 who are interested in indicating interest in specific projects. These
10 commercial interest selections improve the scores of those projects,
11 increasing the likelihood of those projects advancing to the study process
12 and competing for transmission plan deliverability.
- 13 4. West-Wide Governance Pathways Initiative - This effort was launched summer
14 2023 by a coalition of regulators to develop a proposal for continued evolution of
15 governance over Western EIM and EDAM. CAISO then approved the Step 1
16 Recommendation for governance changes, which outlined changes to the scope of
17 primary authority of the Governing Body and the trigger mechanism for making
18 these changes.
- 19 5. Inter-SC Trades in Regional Markets - On September 26th, CAISO approved a
20 proposal to extend inter-SC trade of energy feature to WEIM and EDAM
21 balancing areas.
- 22 • Inter-SC trades are an optional market feature facilitating
23 settlement of aspects of bilateral contracts between scheduling
24 coordinators. Additionally, Inter-SC trades have no effect on
25 market optimization, schedules, or dispatch.
- 26 6. EDAM ISO BAA Participation Rules - Through this initiative, CAISO addressed
27 ISO-BAA specific elements required for EDAM participation, including how to
28 allocate EDAM resource sufficiency evaluation (RSE) failure surcharges and
29 revenues, and options for curing ISO BAA EDAM advisory RSE shortfalls.
- 30 • CAISO reviewed their methodology for recovering revenue for
31 each of the three categories outlined by the EDAM design: (1)

Historical short-term firm/non-firm transmission sales (for ISO it is the wheeling access charge); (2) Portion of new transmission upgrades increasing transfer capability between EDAM areas; and (3) Transmission costs associated with net EDAM wheel through transfers.

- For CAISO, the BAAs EDAM Access Charge Revenue will be sub allocated to PTOs in proportion to their EDAM Recoverable Revenue in relationship to CAISO BAA EDAM Recoverable Revenue. These changes were adopted, but will be implemented following EDAM go-live in 2026.

IX. ANNUAL TABLE

The following table summarizes, by resource type, the total capacity bid or self-scheduled into the market as well as capacity lost due to planned or forced outages. The table also includes total energy awards for each resource broken down by self-schedules versus market awards. Attachment F - 2024 Annual Summary.xlsx provides the details of dispatchable and non-dispatchable resources. Table 5 is an annual summary of dispatchable and non-dispatchable resources including capacity available and unavailable, self-schedules and DAM awards.

Table 5 Background Summary- 2024 Annual Summary						
Dispatchable	Resource Type	Capacity (PMAX in MWh)	Unavailable Capacity (MWh)	DA SS Awards (MWh)	Award due to Market	Total Awards
Dispatchable	Battery - Energy Storage	5,839,143	424,825	3,038	10,188	(41,163)
Dispatchable	Natural Gas Generation	20,802,746	5,194,754	84,282	2,047,106	2,131,388
Dispatchable	Pump Hydro	222,680	222,680	-	-	-
Dispatchable	Hybrid	175,660	1,775	45,702	-	45,702
Non-Dispatchable	Resource Type	Capacity (PMAX in MWh)	Unavailable Capacity (MWh)	DA SS Awards (MWh)	Award due to Market	Total Awards
Non-Dispatchable	BioGas	77,236	338	64,255	24	64,279
Non-Dispatchable	Gas Turbine	299,710	40,934	204,619	676	205,296
Non-Dispatchable	Natural Gas Generation	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Dispatchable	Other	154,343	11,957	5,208	-	5,208
Non-Dispatchable	Solar	10,561,212	428,497	9,495	2,094,001	2,103,496
Non-Dispatchable	Steam Turbine	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Dispatchable	Wind	5,491,785	352,749	609	1,251,572	1,252,181
Total		43,624,514	6,678,509	417,209	5,403,567	5,766,387

1 **X. FUEL PROCUREMENT**

2 During the record period, SDG&E supplied fuel for gas-fired, dispatchable resources in
3 the portfolio. SDG&E performed as the pipeline-registered Fuel Manager and Fuel Supplier for
4 most of its dispatchable resources. These included SDG&E-owned or -contracted resources
5 (Miramar, Cuyamaca, Palomar, Desert Star, Orange Grove, Carlsbad, Pio Pico, Escondido
6 Energy Center, El Cajon Energy Center and Goal Line). The fuel costs for these SDG&E
7 resources are charged to SDG&E's Portfolio Allocation Balancing Account ("PABA") balancing
8 account in the appropriate resource vintages, with the exception of Goal Line which is charged to
9 SDG&E's Transition Cost Balancing Account ("TCBA"). The fuel costs for Pio Pico Energy
10 Center, Carlsbad Energy Center, and Escondido Energy Center are charged to the Local
11 Generating Balancing Account ("LGBA").

12 As discussed in the Commission-approved BPP, SDG&E's procurement process is to
13 secure approximately 90% of forecasted fuel volumes required to serve SDG&E's load forecast
14 (but not economic sales) as firm monthly baseload supply. The advantages of baseload supply
15 are that: (1) it shields ratepayers from potentially volatile day-ahead natural gas prices; (2) it is
16 scheduled by market participants as a higher priority delivery than day-ahead supply; and (3) it
17 reduces the day-to-day trading and scheduling requirements, thereby reducing overall operational
18 requirements. While the cost of baseload supply may be lower or higher than the spot price on
19 any given day, over time, these price differentials average toward zero, leaving SDG&E with the
20 benefits cited above.

21 While most fuel supply was procured as firm monthly baseload, during the Record Year,
22 SDG&E used prevailing day-ahead or intra-day market prices to price out day-ahead or intra-day
23 generation costs, which is consistent with LCD. For example, if the portfolio was short fuel,
24 relative to day-ahead requirements, fuels traders purchased incremental supply at the DAM price.
25 Or, if the portfolio was long on fuel relative to real-time requirements, fuels traders sold the
26 surplus baseload supply at the same-day market price. This coordination between fuel and
27 power trading enabled SDG&E to accurately price variable generation costs so that the benefits
28 of market transactions could be properly evaluated. Both baseload and daily natural gas trades
29 for the record period were executed at competitive prevailing market prices and in compliance
30 with the BPP. All SDG&E natural gas transactions for 2024 were reported and are reviewed by
31 the Commission in SDG&E's QCR under the advice letters cited in Section I, above.

1 During the record period, SDG&E held Backbone Transportation Service (“BTS”) to
2 transport natural gas from the various SoCal Border trading points to the SoCal Citygate.
3 SDG&E purchased the BTS capacity from SoCalGas pipeline to increase the priority of fuel
4 delivery to its dispatchable resources. The decision to purchase BTS is determined by several
5 factors including: the price spread between the SoCal Border point and the SoCal Citygate, the
6 quantity of BTS offered by SoCalGas, and if SDG&E has purchased Firm Interstate capacity that
7 can feed into specific SoCal BTS points. Firm Interstate capacity represent fixed costs and
8 therefore are not considered in the LCD process.

9 The CAISO’s DAM process creates uncertainty of gas quantities to be traded in the
10 DAM. Day-ahead generation awards are not known until approximately 1:00 p.m., well after
11 next-day natural gas finished trading. Because of the time lag, fuels traders need to rely on
12 generation award forecasts and judgment to establish their next-day fuel position. When actual
13 results deviated from forecasted fuel quantities, fuels traders primarily relied on gas balancing
14 services offered on SoCalGas’ system and, the Kern and Southwest Gas pipelines. SDG&E also
15 traded and/or scheduled gas supplies in later pipeline scheduling cycles to avoid potential
16 imbalance penalties. Activity in these later scheduling cycles was avoided to the extent lower
17 availability of competitive bids and offers caused incremental transactions to cost more to
18 SDG&E.

19 **XI. DEMAND RESPONSE**

20 SDG&E has developed and offered a variety of Demand Response (“DR”) programs to
21 its customers since 2001. The scope of these programs has changed as the concept of DR has
22 evolved and has become an integral part of resource planning and energy management. DR
23 programs have design objectives (reliability, economic, emergency, etc.) as well as specific
24 tariffs or guidelines which describe set trigger conditions such as heat rate, system load,
25 temperature forecast and/or emergency conditions. When triggers are met, SDG&E has
26 discretion to dispatch a program, which allows SDG&E to assure event hours are available for
27 times of greater need and optimize the value of the programs.

28 During the record period, SDG&E utilized its DR programs primarily to reduce
29 electricity consumption during peak demand or to respond to system reliability needs. SDG&E’s
30 portfolio consists of programs that have economic triggers as well as programs with all non-

1 economic triggers. Pursuant to D.15-05-005, as discussed above,²⁶ SDG&E's Capacity Bidding
2 Program ("CBP") and AC Saver Program²⁷ demand response programs, are subject to the LCD
3 standard as they have economic triggers and have been bid into the CAISO market during 2024.
4 In the remainder of this section, SDG&E provides information pertaining to the CBP program in
5 SDG&E's DR portfolio and explains how the program was utilized in 2024.

6 **A. Capacity Bidding Program**

7 Capacity Bidding Program ("CBP") is a voluntary Demand Response program available
8 to all commercial and industrial customers in the SDG&E's territory. CBP operational period is
9 from May 1st to October 31st each year. Program operation hours are Monday through Saturday,
10 excluding holidays, from 1 P.M. to 9 P.M. Participants receive a monthly capacity payment in
11 exchange for reducing their load when requested by the utility. Participating customers who are
12 also receiving bundled services from SDG&E receive an additional energy payment during CBP
13 events.

14 CBP participating customers can choose to participate in one of two CBP products: (1)
15 CBP Elect Day-Ahead, and (2) CBP Elect Day-Of. The distinction between the product types is
16 the pre-event notification timing. Under the Day-Ahead Product, customers are notified by no
17 later than 5 P.M. the day prior to the actual event. The Day-Of Product, provides event
18 notification forty minutes prior to the start of the event. SDG&E continues to bid all products in
19 the day-ahead CAISO market because the CAISO has limitations on dispatching in real time.

20 CBP is capped at 24 events per product and six times per month in May through October.
21 The following is a list of CBP programs and triggers:

- 22 • There are three Day-Ahead price triggers for Elect options:
- 23 • Elect option 1 = \$200 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 24 • Elect option 2 = \$400 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 25 • Elect option 3 = \$600 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 26 • There are three Day-Of price triggers for Elect options:
- 27 • Elect option 1 = \$200 1-9pm Day-Of

²⁶ See RA-2 above.

²⁷ D.16.-06-029 in conjunction with AL 3050-E-A and AL 3050-E-B approved on July 21, 2017 and effective January 1, 2017.

- Elect option 2 = \$400 1-9pm Day-Of
- Elect option 3 = \$600 1-9pm Day-Of
- SDG&E may call an event if SDG&E system conditions warrant; or
- At the request of CAISO as a result of a declared emergency²⁸

Although the CBP tariff outlines program triggers, SDG&E is not required to dispatch the CBP program every time the economic trigger is reached. Therefore, SDG&E takes forecasted system demand, program limitations, and customer fatigue into account before making a final decision about dispatching the program.

The CBP Elect options were bid in based on the election price of \$200, \$400, or \$600.

The CBP DA 1pm-9pm elect \$600 option was activated on two (2) occasions during the 2024 event season including a test event held on 08/27/2024. In all cases when CBP events were initiated during the 2024 record period, the quantified economic triggers from the tariff were met, and SDG&E determined that the system needs warranted such actions.

B. Demand Response Metrics

In D.14-05-025, the Commission approved various reporting requirements proposed by Cal PA. The following discussion outlines those requirements as well as the manner in which SDG&E responded to them for Record Year 2024.

1. An annual summary of the results of the reporting requirement (related to dispatch of DR resources) adopted in D.14-05-025. At a minimum, the utilities should provide a summary of:
 - a. The times and duration that all programs were dispatched;
 - b. All cases where the DR program's trigger conditions were forecast to be met, and all cases where these trigger conditions were met;
 - c. A list of occurrences when DR resources should have been dispatched but were not (*i.e.*, a DR resource's economic trigger conditions were forecast

²⁸ Emergency Only Events: An Emergency Only Event is defined as an event that is called due to a CAISO alert or local Utility emergency when the program would not otherwise be available. For example, events called on Sundays, Holidays or after the maximum events per month has been reached will be considered Emergency Only Events. There is no limit on the number of Emergency Only Events called due to CAISO Alerts and/or CAISO Emergencies and for Utility system emergencies.

- by the utility, but it was not dispatched). Each occurrence should be accompanied by an explanation detailing the reason for non-dispatch.
2. In addition to the Reporting Requirement in D.14-05-025, a calculation should be provided of the number of hours when the utility forecasts that trigger criteria will be reached, as a percentage of hours in which trigger conditions were reached in the same time period (monthly and annual basis).
 3. The total energy dispatched as a proportion of maximum available energy for each DR program under scope of the proceeding (monthly and annual breakdowns). This comparison should be provided in both percentage and nominal (MWh) terms. An example of the format is provided below:
 - a. In 2024 record year, utility A's CBP program dispatched 100 MWh. This is compared to a total maximum available dispatch of 200 MWh for that program.
 - b. Therefore, utility A's CBP program did not dispatch 100 MWh of its total maximum available energy.
 - c. In 2024 record year, utility A dispatched 50% of the available energy in the CBP program.
 4. For each event the full capacity was not dispatched, an explanation should be provided as to why the DR resource was not dispatched to its maximum availability during the record period.
 5. If the metrics in (3.) above show that available energy was not dispatched for a program, provide an estimate of the net cost impact on overall resource dispatch of not utilizing maximum available amounts when the program triggers have been forecasted to be reached. This metric should focus on the net cost of dispatching metric (3)(b).
 6. Metrics should be provided by the utility to identify whether the selection of DR events called minimized the utility's overall portfolio costs of dispatching supply resources. This assessment should include the average hourly net cost impact by program.
 - a. For events dispatched in the record year.
 - b. For all time periods when DR program triggers were forecasted by the

1 utility (whether dispatched or not).

2 c. Comparison of a) and b) in both percentages and nominal (MWh) terms.

- 3 7. An explanation of how opportunity cost analyses were used to make the decision
4 to call or not call an event. This should include an explanation of the
5 opportunity cost methodology and demonstration of its application.

6 SDG&E has reviewed the preceding requirements, and in the following, discusses how
7 the metrics SDG&E supplied in the accompanying attachments to this testimony for record
8 period 2024 comply with these requirements.

- 9 1. *Attachment G - 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx* provides CBP
10 summary results of when program was dispatched, when trigger conditions were
11 forecasted and/or met, a list of occurrences when CBP was not dispatched but hit
12 triggers, as well as the reason for non-dispatch.
- 13 2. In the 2024 record period, SDG&E used the DAM clearing prices as the forecast
14 trigger criteria for CBP Day-Ahead because the deadline to call the event is after
15 the Day-Ahead final schedules are published. With respect to CBP Day-Of,
16 SDG&E used the published DAM clearing prices and other real-time market
17 conditions to determine if the CBP Day-Of should have been dispatched but did
18 not forecast price triggers. As a result, the hours when the utility forecasts the
19 trigger will be the same as the number of hours when the trigger conditions were
20 met and no further data was provided.
- 21 3. *Attachment H - 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 2.xlsx* provides CBP
22 summary results of total energy dispatched as a proportion of the maximum
23 available energy for CBP Day-Ahead and Day-Of. The comparison provides the
24 metric in percentage and nominal (MWh) terms.
- 25 4. *Attachment G - 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx* provides an
26 explanation when CBP was not dispatched but hit triggers. CBP Day-Ahead
27 Product and Day-Of was dispatched to full capacity each time SDG&E triggered
28 an event.
- 29 5. *Attachment I - 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 5.xlsx* provides a net cost
30 impact of CBP Day-Ahead and Day-Of when triggers were met and resource
31 was not dispatched to its maximum available capacity.

1 6. Attachment *J - 2024 ERRR Demand Response Metric 6* provides the average
2 hourly net cost CBP events called in the 2024 record period compared to the
3 average hourly potential next cost from all times when trigger conditions were
4 forecast (Dispatched or Not).

5 7. As described above in Section X, SDG&E utilized its DR programs during the
6 record period primarily to reduce electricity consumption during peak demand or
7 in response to system reliability needs. The instances in which SDG&E did not
8 call events when triggers were met, were based on a combination of current
9 system needs, and the benefit of reserving the resource to provide for a greater
10 system need.

11 **XII. CONCLUSION**

12 My prepared direct testimony describes SDG&E's plans and processes used during the
13 record period for serving load from its fully integrated portfolio of utility-owned resources,
14 power purchase contracts and market transactions, consistent with the Commission-approved
15 BPP in effect. SDG&E consistently complied with applicable Commission's decisions
16 addressing LCD requirements for the 2024 record period. In summary, SDG&E's LCD
17 processes are fully consistent with and satisfied the Commission's requirements by considering
18 variable costs and utilizing the lowest-cost resource mix, subject to constraints in the day-ahead,
19 hour-ahead and real-time markets. Therefore, SDG&E requests that the Commission find that
20 SDG&E demonstrated compliance with the Commission's LCD and SOC 4 standards during the
21 2024 record period.

22 This concludes my prepared direct testimony.

1 **XIII. QUALIFICATIONS**

2 My name is Rolyn Abugan. My business address is 8315 Century Park Court, San
3 Diego, CA 92123. I am currently employed by SDG&E as a Sr. Transaction Scheduler. My
4 responsibilities include scheduling, bidding, E-tagging and other tasks in the CAISO day-ahead
5 energy market to optimize resources and minimize cost to load. I also coordinate planned
6 outages and manage the monthly resource adequacy replacement portfolio. I assumed my
7 current position in September 2023.

8 I previously worked on the real-time scheduling desk for SDG&E, responsible for
9 generation dispatch, scheduling, bidding, outage management and other tasks in the CAISO
10 hour-ahead and real-time energy markets to optimize resources and minimize cost to load. Prior
11 to joining SDG&E in 2021, my experience included seven years as a NERC certified Balancing
12 Authority and Transmission system operator and seven years as a nuclear plant operator.

13 I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from University of
14 California, Riverside.

ATTACHMENT A

2024 SUMMARY LOAD DATA AND LMP PRICE FORECASTS.XLSX

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS ENTIRETY

Due to its large size, this attachment is only being sent electronically

ATTACHMENT B

2024 INCREMENTAL BID COST CALCULATIONS.XSLX

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Due to its large size, this attachment is only being sent electronically.

ATTACHMENT C

2024 SELF SCHEDULES SUPPORTING DATA 1.XLSX

CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTACHMENT D

2024 SELF SCHEDULES SUPPORTING DATA 2.XLSX

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ATTACHMENT E

2024 MASTER FILE (RDT) CHANGE EXCEPTIONS.XLSX

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ATTACHMENT F
2024 ANNUAL SUMMARY.XLSX

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ATTACHMENT G

2024 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 1.XSLX

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ATTACHMENT H

2024 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC .XSLX

Due to its large size, this attachment is only being sent electronically.

ATTACHMENT I

2024 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 5.XSLX

Due to its large size, this attachment is only being sent electronically.

ATTACHMENT J

2024 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 6.XSLX

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ATTACHMENT K
ENERGY STORAGE OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

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ATTACHMENT L

CONFIDENTIALITY DECLARATION OF ROLYN ABUGAN

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA

DECLARATION
OF ROLYN ABUGAN

A.25-06-

Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U 902-E) for Approval of: (i) Contract Administration, Least Cost Dispatch and Power Procurement Activities in 2024, (ii) Costs Related to those Activities Recorded to the Energy Resource Recovery Account and Transition Cost Balancing Account in 2024 and (iii) Costs Recorded in Related Regulatory Accounts in 2024

I, Rolyn Abugan, do declare as follows:

1. I am a Sr. Transaction Scheduler for San Diego Gas & Electric Company ("SDG&E"). I have included my Direct Testimony ("Testimony") in support of SDG&E's Application for Approval of: (i) Contract Administration, Least Cost Dispatch and Power Procurement Activities in 2024, and (ii) Costs Related to those Activities Recorded to the Energy Resource Recovery Account, incurred during the Record Period January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024, and (iii) the Costs Recorded in Related Regulatory Accounts in 2024. Additionally, as a Sr. Transaction Scheduler, I am thoroughly familiar with the facts and representations in this declaration and if called upon to testify I could and would testify to the following based upon personal knowledge.

2. I am providing this Declaration to demonstrate that the confidential information ("Protected Information") in support of the referenced Application falls within the scope of data provided confidential treatment in the IOU Matrix ("Matrix") attached to the Commission's Decision D.06-06-066 (the Phase I Confidentiality decision). Pursuant to the procedures adopted in D.08-04-023, I am addressing each of the following five features of Ordering Paragraph 2 in D.06-06-066:

- that the material constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix;
- the category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to;
- that SDG&E is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data;
- that the information is not already public; and
- that the data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure.

3. The Protected Information contained in my Testimony constitutes material, market sensitive, electric procurement-related information that is within the scope of Section 454.5(g) of the Public Utilities Code. As such, the Protected Information provided by SDG&E is allowed confidential treatment in accordance with Appendix 1 - IOU Matrix in D.06-06-066.

Confidential Information	Matrix Reference	Reason for Confidentiality
Table 2- Column Cost Impact	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs (Energy Resource Recovery Account), Confidential for three years
Table 3-a Table 3-b	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs
Attachment A	VI.B XI II.A.2	Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (for MWh), Confidential front three years Monthly Procurement Costs Utility Electric Price Forecast, Confidential for three years
Attachment B	II.B XI	Utility Retained Generation (URG) Confidential for three years Monthly Procurement Costs
Attachment C, D	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs

Attachment E	IX.B	Recorded data on specific resources (rather than broad categories of supply sources) used to serve bundled load; Appendix I IOU Matrix does not specify effective period of confidentiality.
	IV.A	Forecast of IOU Generation Resources
Attachment F	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs
	VI.B	Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (for MWh)
Attachment K	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs

4. I am not aware of any instances where the Protected Information has been disclosed to the public. To my knowledge, no party, including SDG&E, has publicly revealed any of the Protected Information.

5. I will comply with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for the Protected Information.

6. The Protected Information cannot be provided in a form that is aggregated, partially redacted, or summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a manner that would allow further disclosure of the data while still protecting confidential information.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 29th Day of May, 2025, at San Diego, California.

Signed by:

 8892C552B105432...
 Rolyn Abugan
 Sr. Transaction Scheduler
 5/29/2025

ACRONYM GLOSSARY

A/S	Ancillary Services
ADS	Automated Dispatch System
AL	Advice Letter
BCR	Bid Cost Recovery
BIP	Base Interruptible Program
BPP	Bundled Procurement Plan
BTS	Backbone Transportation Service
CAISO	California Independent System Operator
CAL PA	California Public Advocates Office
CBP	Capacity Bidding Program
CCGT	Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CIDI	Customer Inquiry Dispute and Information
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
CT	Combustion Turbines
D	Decision
DA	Day Ahead
DAM	Day Ahead Market
DLAP	Default Load Aggregation Point
DR	Demand Response
DSEC	Desert Star Energy Center
ECEC	El Cajon Energy Center
ED	Exceptional Dispatch
EEC	Escondido Energy Center
ERRA	Energy Resource Recovery Account
ES&D	Energy Supply and Dispatch
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HASP	Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process
ICE	Intercontinental Exchange
IFM	Integrated Forward Market
IST	Inter-SC Trade
LCD	Least Cost Dispatch
LMP	Locational Marginal Price
LSE	Load Serving Entity
LTPP	Long Term Procurement Plan
LTSA	Long Term Service Agreement
MIP	Mixed Integer Processing
MRTU	Market Redesign Technology Upgrade
MSG	Multi-stage Generation
MW	Megawatt
NGI	National Gas Intelligence
NGR	Non-generating Resources
Non-spin	Non-spinning Reserve

NYMEX	New York Mercantile Exchange
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OFO	Operational Flow Order
OG	Orange Grove
OMEC	Otay Mesa Energy Center
OMS	Outage Management System
ORA	Office of Ratepayer Advocates (Now California Public Advocates Office)
OTC	Over-the-counter
PCI	Power Costs Inc.
PDR	Proxy Demand Response
PEC	Palomar Energy Center
Pnode	Pricing Node
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
PRG	Procurement Review Group
PRT	Pattern Recognition Technologies
QCR	Quarterly Compliance Report
QF	Qualifying Facility
RA	Resource Adequacy
RATA	Relative Accuracy Test
RD	Regulation Down
RDRR	Reliability Demand Response Resource
RDT	Resource Data Template or Master File
RNS	Residual Net Short
RT	Real-Time
RTM	Real-Time Market
RU	Regulation Up
RUC	Residual Unit Commitment
SC	Scheduling Coordinator
SDG&E	San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
SIBR	Scheduling Infrastructure & Business Rules
SOC	Standard of Conduct
SOC	State of Charge
SoCalGas	Southern California Gas Company
SP15	South Path 15
Spin	Spinning Reserve
UOG	Utility Owned Generation
VER	Variable Energy Resources
VOM	Variable Operations and Maintenance